In the fall of 2011 China’s former president Jiang Zemin was believed to have died. For several months he had not made any public appearances. Black Audis drove up to his residence to pay their last respects to his dead body — or so Chinese microbloggers and social media assumed. A Hong Kong television station prematurely aired the news of Jiang’s death and was therefore fined for the the indiscretion. (for an in-depth analysis of the fine line that Chinese media companies, especially social media companies such as Sina and Tencent, check out my recently published article in International Journal of Communication: http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1643/814

Jiang: the congress manipulator

The 17th party congress of China’s organized leninists in 2007 was supposed to be the show when general secretary and president Hu Jintao would usher in his choice of successor to the throne — Li Keqiang. It was not to be, since Hu’s predecessor Jiang Zemin wanted Xi Jinping, rather than Li, to become the next man on top. Like Deng Xiapoing, the man who handpicked Jiang to become the new leader after the Tiananmen massacre, Jiang Zemin has pulled backdoor strings, manipulated behind the scenes to get his men to positions of power ahead of both the 17th and 18th party congresses. No wonder pictures and videos from the 18th party congress shows him relishing the official limelight again (when the 86-year old octogenarian does not fall a sleep).

Impact of Jiang’s retaining influence

Jiang Zemin’s spectacular return from the shadow of death raise many questions. As I see it there are two overarching concerns at this junction in the party’s life.

First, institutionalization of processes for selection of successors to the party throne. Obviously, selections and successions are still dependent on scheming behind the scenes and informal rather than formal power, rules regarding age limits, and so called intra-party democracy. For the political system, however, no matter how much party documents speak of collective and consensual decison-making (regarding day-to-day affairs) it raises the specter of personal rule, rule of man, and lack of rule of law yet again. Since the ascension of Hu Jintao to apex of party power in 2002, it was believed that Chinese politics were on the right track of institutionalization.  Far away from unstable putsch and coup politics – adapting to a new era it seemed. Nevertheless, the return of Jiang Zemin showcases that backroom bickering and wrangling are still dominating features of Chinese elite politics. For one, it tells us something about how profound the looming economic and social crisis in Chinese society is perceived to be among party insiders. Thus, the need for the stepping in of senior and even paramount leaders such as Jiang Zemin

Second, what does Jiang’s ushering in of his proteges and his proteges’ proteges into the politburo, its standing committee, and the secretariat this week at the 18th party congress say about the prospects for significant and needed economic and political reform? As the new standing committee of the politburo was announced on 15 November in Beijing, it was revealed that the rumors were true. Of the seven males selected for top service, five can be regarded as belonging to the camp of Jiang Zemin. Only Li Keqiang and Liu Yunshan owe their allegiance to the outgoing leader Hu Jintao.

A U-turn for political and economic reform?

Well, it could mean continued paralysis of the political system, and even more inertia making the party and the government even more inept to push for reform. The amorphous princeling faction headed by Xi Jinping, somewhat backed by Jiang Zemin could run into deadlock with other parts of the political system that side with Hu Jintao’s Youth League faction.

OR, to the contrary, the consolidation of power around Xi Jinping — if there now indeed is a strong sense of urgency among Jiang Zemin and other senior party leaders that it is either reform or perish for the party in the coming ten years — could mean that more could actually be done than most observes assume. Especially if Hu Jintao is to resign from his chairmanship of the central military commission and hand over formal reigns of power to Xi Jinping.

However, the continuing influence of Jiang Zemin may mean there will only be reforms reflecting his own reign of power during the 1990s. As he implemented the further liberalization of the Chinese economy but only allowed a brief Spring of more open debate on political reform in 1998, the best bet would be that plans for economic restructuring and attempts at breaking the stranglehold of state companies and banks may be underway — but that political reform is pushed into the background for some more years.

While the ongoing affair in China surrounding would-be-politburo-standing-committee member Bo Xilai, is still unfolding, fellow princeling and Vice President, Xi Jinping, has warmed up for his future position as China’s paramount leader. I am sure there must have been some serious headache and sweating among aides in the Chinese delegation accompanying him on his journey to the west (Washington and Iowa) and back via the crisis stricken Eurozone (spending three days in Ireland). On Sunday, 19 February Xi  was given a 40-minute tour of a family-run dairy farm at Sixmilebridge, County Clare. According to the first BBC World report I read, the Princeling was honored by the Irish farmer in a special way: “In Sixmilebridge, the Chinese vice-president had a newborn calf named in his honour.” The updated report http://bbc.in/xQxHHU, however, has nothing about this. Pity.

Institutionalization of leadership succession

The succession from incumbent President Hu Jintao and the Vice President Xi Jinping has been viewed as certain since 2008. When Hu Jintao took over from President Jiang Zemin ten years ago, that process of changing of the leadership guard was hailed as a sign of a mature Leninist political system. Institutionalization and rule of law, would be the new orderly way of Chinese politics.

Since the beginning of February, however, there have been lots of speculation about what the Vice Mayor of Chongqing and long-time henchman of Bo Xilai – Wang Lijun – actually told the American diplomats at the Consulate General in Chengdu — about Bo’s policies and methods to fight corruption, Bo’s, Wang’s and other senior leaders’ own implications in corruption scandals, and proclivities among the 5th generation leaders who are now rising to power?

During the last two years, 2009-2011, the nostalgic flirting with Maoism 1960s-style by Politburo Standing Committee hopeful, Chongqing Mayor and princeling Bo Xilai  has caught the attention by both domestic Chinese and international media. Other party intellectuals and leaders on the other hand, have turned their eyeballs to the period before the most disastrous period of Maoist upheaval, terror, and human suffering. They look to the 1930s for ideological guidance, to light the torch that will guide the CCP in the difficult years ahead. This all seems natural, since the truth and wisdom must always be sought within the party. To search outside party perimeters is inherently hazardous for an elitist grouping such as a Leninist party. It would be detrimental for the cultivated identity as the self-appointed guardianship role of Chinese society and send out the wrong signals to the locked-in public sphere. But how much of this trend of looking back into the history of the CCP is really a return of ideology – after decades of Dengist pragmatism – or just playing poker in the run-up to the 2012 party congress? For sure, much about “red Chongqing” was about  玩政治, i.e. playing politics. Nevertheless, the tapping into the pool of concepts, ideas, and lived experience of Chinese political history today indicates something important. Quests of an ideological nature do take place during times of uncertainty, and in Chinese tradition a year of the dragon like 2012, means unexpected things will turn up.

Playing politics in the open is back

Ever since the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, the mainstream of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has since then  focused on keeping the fringe forces of rightist liberals and leftist conservatives at bay. Deng Xiaoping always maintained, actually from 1978 and onwards, that a pragmatist center solution was the only way China could go – to avoid useless struggle and instead grow the economy for the benefit of all. For a concise layout concerning a return of the more open splits in Chinese politics today, read “Battle of men and ideas for party’s future” http://bit.ly/xKD21z

If the scandal with Bo Xilai’s once closest confidante, Wang Lijun, now interrogated by party central security in Beijing gains more momentum, it may topple not just Chongqing’s flamboyant Mayor, he may still drag others down in his fall. The long hot summer of 2012 will be very interesting to follow for everyone concerned about Chinese politics, the world economy and global politics more broadly

SIIA Conference Report No 1 – Burma

Tonight I had dinner at a Chinese restaurant in Lusaka, Zambia. The premises were quite opulent and luxurious: the large two-story brick building was brightly lit and easily spotted at a distance. After having waded through the layer of large mots that also had followed the headlights from afar I entered. Wow. It was huge, 6 meters to the ceiling and about 15 tables at the ground floor. Two Chinese women stood behind the front counter/bar while the seven idle Zambian waiters rested their backs and shoulders against the counter or walls. No one shouted Huanying Guanglin, the standard greeting when you dare approach a restaurant of this grandeur in China. I was silently but politely led to the table chosen for me. The other customers were five Chinese and another fellowship of Zambians devouring classic dishes of the Cathay around the larger tables.

The story

The menu in English given to me, did strike me as a bit boring and bland. Nurturing the hope that maybe the Chinese menu would show more variety, I Instead asked for the menu in Chinese. With it came the Chinese lady in charge. After I had ordered my spicy beef shreds, fried Yangzhou rice and sweet melon cakes, she asked me if I was of European descent. I acknowledged that that indeed was the case. Then she could not help but immediately tell me what she had experienced last Wednesday here at her restaurant.  A company of people from the Swedish Embassy had ordered several dishes, one of which was sweet and sour pork. As those folks didn’t appreciate this particular dish, they called the waiter to the table and said no way – never – were they going to pay for this awfully prepared dish. The Zambian waiter went to ask the Chinese chef what could possibly have gone wrong. He shook his head and said nothing was wrong. The effort was made by him to explain that this was how the dish was prepared in Jiangxi Province of China. At this stage, the Madame in charge of the establishment had then intervened and asked – what was the matter? The gentleman who spoke for the others assured her he did not want to hear any more explanations, he was not going to pay for the dish. Then Madame had exploded, without him paying she was going to call the police to sort this out. The (gentle)man had shouted back at her that that was no use. They were all diplomats, see. Then it had turned into an ugly slanging match, all-yelling like a bunch of hyenas. In the end they left without paying for the sweet and sour pork. Madame and her husband went out to check the plates of their cars as they swooshed away. Apparently the plates and other symbols indicated that these people were from the Swedish Embassy. Then I interjected and said that not only was I European, I was also of Swedish stock, usually a mild tempered and cautious branch on the tree of humanity. She took one step back, after a while she asked me:

- Is this an expression of your Western culture? The other day when an American was here I asked him and he said that if you’re displeased with the food served at a restaurant you can ask the staff to take it away and that’s just fine.

- Well, I think that happens quite rarely. If you are really, really displeased or even disgusted by the food, then some guests may refuse to pay. But I told her I had never done that, and never seen it happen around me either.

- Whatever, whatever, I used to hold you Europeans and your culture high. Thought it was dignified, courteous and all dignified. Now, I have changed my mind. She began to walk away from my table.

- Surely, you cannot judge a whole country, a whole continent, or a whole civilization from one person’s behavior? Such things cannot be commonplace here?

- It has happened before with other disrespectful Western guests. And mind you he was from your embassy! He was not just anyone, and as he flaunted himself with his diplomatic immunity. If you continue with this superior and overbearing attitude against us Chinese, we will surely act accordingly

The unhappy ending

Feeling somewhat awkward in this storyline, the waiter who delivered my food said the incident had happened just a few days ago, so Madame was still a bit upset. The waiter then elaborated how Madame had also been angry with her, for not having properly explained in detail to the guests how this dish tasted and was prepared. A little later, as Madame approached and a bit anxiously asked me how the food was, I said that it was great and that I would surely make the full transaction later on. I soon did and left. When I retold this story to the taxi driver, he said:

- That lady, I know her. She is very rough, very rough. I worked as a driver for her one month last year, December it was. Once I took her and her much milder husband to a shopping center. They told me to wait there until they were back. They never came. I waited and waited. Then I went to another shopping center in another part of town. Happily I spotted them. But Madame was very angry with me. She said: “you stupid Zambian, I told you to wait over there, did I not?” That very day I walked out on her and never came back. She has some nerve to speak of courtesy and being superior. And by the way, she was wrong in her conclusion about Europeans too. If one Chinese behaves like a criminal, should we say 1 billion Chinese are all criminals?

- Well, I said. She did score a point though. If they were embassy staff, they did not just represent themselves. They represent a country, even the European Union.

I have not heard the European/Swedish side of this story (yet), so it is difficult to pass out any final judgment. One thing seems pretty obvious though, the least arrogant in this story of intercultural exchange in Zambia are – the Zambians.

Of particular interest are the unfolding relations between democratic and welfare-oriented Brazil and authoritarian and growth-oriented China under Brazil’s leader Dilma Rousseff and China’s incoming new President Xi Jinping, who is likely to take over the state rudder after incumbent President Hu Jintao. Within the international system, China and Brazil are dominating their respective home regions, Brazil arguably more so in South America than China in East Asia. In the near future, the decibels and sounds of their voices will continue to increase in both old and new forums such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the G20-group. As of yet, both countries are guided by the common ideas independence, pragmatism and longing for international respect in their foreign policy strategies.

Brazilian brazenness and cautious China

During the failed negotiations on climate change in Copenhagen 2010, the BASIC-group put up resistance against the USA and the EU countries. Their powerful argument was that developed countries had accumulated debt for more than hundred years of CO2 emissions, and that they had a legitimate right to raise their countries’ living standards through industrialization. In the seemingly endless trade negotiations of the WTO Doha round, the BASICs have often coalesced around similar positions against the developed countries. Yet, in the aftermath of the still ongoing global financial crisis that kicked in with the credit crunch, first in the United States in 2007 and then hitting the Eurozone severely, fault lines have become visible also in the BASIC-structure and between the BRICS. In September 2011 the Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega proposed that the BASIC-countries, together with Russia, would financially assist the richer developed countries to save them from sinking even deeper into debt problems, to stop financial contagion to spread to developing nations. Although this proposal was picked up by Chinese state-owned mass media as sensational and signaling the changing world order, Mantega’s Chinese colleague did not support the initiative.

Notwithstanding the obvious clichés inherent in describing Brazilians as burlesque and emotional, and Chinese as reserved and technocratic, this pairing of adjectives make more sense than the other way around. Arguably, the broader relationship as well as existing and incipient differences between these two emerging economies and geopolitical players has not yet been fully investigated in research on international politics. Under its former President Lula, Brazil moved from being a constantly under-achieving promise to become the bright star on the global scene. Not just an economic power house, it went from economic mess and political instability to being a social example and a model for other developing countries.

Democratic Brazil of the South, Authoritarian China of the North

How can a democratic and appreciated Brazil liked by many and an authoritarian China with few friends work together on a set of difficult issues in the domain of global public policy in the future? Perhaps there is no real contradiction as long as they both perceive the developed Western countries as imperialistic in character and hegemonic in action? If that is not the case, the long cherished and in recent years reinvigorated notion of South-South Cooperation (now with add-on notion of mutual win-win) may loose its current force. The major economic risk in the bilateral relationship between the two nations is that Brazil starts to perceive the West a lesser hegemonic and economic threat than – China. It’s not so much the absolute numbers that is the problem, Brazil had a trade surplus of 5.2 Billion with China in 2010, as what is being traded. As the trade balance between them develops, it certainly looks more like a classic trade exchange between the resource rich and dependent colony and the mother country, which refines the ore and exports it back as a value-added and branded product. Some have argued that Brazil is de-industrializing as a consequence, but not only that, Brazilian agribusiness is also feeling hammered by Chinese land acquisitions around the country. Therefore, Along with this economic risk, comes the political risk of a China that looks set to become the world’s number one economy. As numero uno, China may no longer cling to the agenda of South-South Cooperation in practice, although it is unlikely to through it overboard in even the medium term. China could become more interested in keeping (and slightly modify) the existing world order institutions than replacing them with something entirely new. Already, there have been murmurings and a great deal of surprise in Brazil that China does not want to reform the United Nations Security Council. A reform would almost certainly result in a permanent seat for Brazil – but also for India and perhaps Japan. And China is reluctant to see these two neighboring big countries be given seats at the table of the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Future issues of contention

Other issues may heat up as well. In the Spring of 2011, the Brazilian Finance Minister Mantega warned of coming currency wars due to the undervalued Chinese Yuan, which continues to give China a comparative advantage as an exporter of already cheaply produced consumer goods. Human rights is another such policy area where contention is likely to emerge, even the issue of climate change may be an area where the two may ultimately choose different courses (2). There are just too many differences between political systems, more trade competition on the respective home markets and the world market. Add to this the geopolitical rivalry between China and India. Thus, when looking back on today’s debates from a future vantage point perhaps the bloc of BASIC/BRICS never went any further than building the basic structure of occasional joint meetings, it never materialized or institutionalized into a true force of the developing global South. An interesting runner-up platform is instead the IBSA forum, a trilateral meeting between the democracies India, Brazil and South Africa (1).

(1)  Oliver Stuenkel, “See Does IBSA matter?,” 23 October, 2011,http://www.postwesternworld.com/

(2)  Carlos Pereira and João Augusto De Castro Neves, “Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition,” Brookings Policy Paper, No.26, March 2011.

I ‘m just back in Stockholm from the Engelsberg Seminar in Avesta. This year the seminar’s theme was Politics and Ideology. Although a couple of very distinguished political science scholars and historians pressed home the idea that ideology is something very different from the everyday practise of “playing of politics,” in many discussions the two words were still used as mutually exchangeable concepts.

Well, they are not. Ideology is a set of beliefs that constitute distinct programs to mould and change human beings and nature to construct a better world for themselves and their fellow men and women. The non-religious search for a way that allowed human agency to create, if not exactly paradise, at least a better future for humanity during life on earth all began in the pre-enlightenment period in European history culminating with the French Revolution in 1789. The term ideology, however, was invented by Destutt de Tracy seven years later.  Although many non-Europeans may (and perhaps should) contest the view that there existed no proper ideologies before Europe became a laboratory of competing ideas and thought from the Renaissance and onwards to the 1700s, and that they became imparted and forced upon the rest of the world only through colonialist oppression and hegemony in the following centuries.

Eurocentrism

To an extent this ethnocentric and Eurocentric view has to do with the definitions employed. Often core concepts in political science such as ideology can be better understood if dissected by other academic disciplines (and sometimes vice versa). As argued by the brilliant anthropologist Clifford Geertz in 1973, ideologies are not distinctive kinds of belief systems, as much as they are distinctive phases in the development of cultural systems.

A worldwide comeback of ideology

One of the participants, John Keane, from the University of Sydney argued that we are about to enter an era when ideology returns. He predicted the final demise of social democracy and the rise of the “greening” of politics. I have long viewed the politics of the last two decades as non-ideological, if you don’t interpret the so-called “war on terror” as a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations and the Bush doctrine to spread democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan as basically an ideological struggle between the ideals of open democracy and closed Muslim theocracy. At any rate, in the Western democracies election campaigns has focused mostly on management issues: what party, what coalition of parties can best deliver the most welfare to the people. The struggle for political power has been a fight for the middle class and center-right politics have been the recourse to take for parties left and right. The focus has been to grow the economy and perform well, to get elected. If the word ideology has been used, it has been employed in a rather feeble way as pointing back to party roots — not used to stake out claims for a new prosperous future based on those very ideals.

The return of ideology in China?

In China too – with its authoritarian political system and model of state capitalism which was discussed in the panel I was on together with Minxin Pei, Robert Kaplan, and Mark Leonard –  the mainstream of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has since the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 focused on keeping the fringe forces of rightist liberals and leftist conservatives at bay. Deng Xiaoping always maintained, actually from 1978 and onwards, that a pragmatist center solution was the only way China could go – to avoid useless struggle and instead grow the economy for the benefit of all. Yet, the 1980s was a period filled with struggles about what was the correct weltanschauung for a modernizing China. Ostensibly, the overarching battle was between the forces of conservative Marxist-Leninists and authoritarian capitalist-pragmatists.

“Red culture” for the party or for society

During the last two years, 2009-2011, the nostalgic flirting with Maoism 1960s-style by Politburo member-in-waiting, Chongqing Mayor, former Minister of Trade, princeling Bo Xilai  has caught the attention by both domestic Chinese and international media. Other party intellectuals, apparatchiks, and leaders have turned their eyeballs to the period before the most disastrous period of Maoist upheaval, terror, and human suffering. They look to the 1930s for ideological guidance, to lit the torch that will guide party central in the years ahead. This all seems natural, since the truth and wisdom must always be sought within the party. To search outside party perimeters is inherently hazardous for an elitist grouping such as a Leninist party. It would be bad for the cultivated identity as the self-appointed guardianship role of Chinese society and send out the wrong signals to the locked-in public sphere. But how much of this trend of looking back into the history of the CCP is really a return of ideology – after decades of Dengist pragmatism – or just playing poker in the run-up to the 2012 party congress? Arguably, it is very much about 玩政治, i.e. playing politics. However, the tapping into the pool of concepts, ideas, and lived experience of Chinese political history today is revealing. Quests of an ideological nature do take place during times of uncertainty — of that we can be sure.

China’s rulers, foreign ministry and state-controlled newspapers all say that Africa is ripe for take-off. This optimistic slogan is refreshing after so many decades of “Afro-pessimism,” which focused on the tragedies of the resource curse, war, disease and incompetent governance. The siren song is performed with enthusiasm by China’s Communist Party leaders, stock markets and fund managers alike. To a large extent the new optimism is the result of the search by Chinese state-owned companies and other Asian multinationals for raw materials in Africa. It is arguable that China’s financing and implementation of Africa’s construction boom contributes to better development prospects for the world’s poorest continent. New South-South cooperation, and particularly Asian-African partnerships in various forms, is clearly deepening economic and political relations with African countries, leading to a redrawing of geo-economic boundaries and the geopolitical map of Africa.

The dynamics of Asian-African economic cooperation

The presence in Africa is meant to provide two-way benefits: South-South Cooperation is not unidirectional. Several Asian nations have organized forums and summits together with African countries to enhance mutual goals. These new Asian-African architectures and frameworks are fundamental to the building of consistent bilateral and multilateral relations. China, Japan and India, but also South Korea, are all putting considerable efforts into vying for influence. Japan’s Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process began this type of cooperation in 1993. Although China’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) started later, in 2000, it has been the most successful. The First Korea-Africa Forum was held to strengthen cooperation with African countries in November 2006.

Purpose and questions

The purpose of this paper is to critically investigate the new challenges that foreign aid, an investor presence and investment from East Asian countries present to Western governments, and local civil societies and politics in Africa as seen through the prism of Zambia, Mozambique and Uganda.

The three questions that this paper seeks to answer are:

• How does the increasing presence of Chinese, Japanese and South Korean private and state-owned companies and state interests affect local politics and civil society? Is good governance as a policy goal in any way undermined?
• Do the company investment, and government credits and aid from these Asian countries work against or in accordance with decisions taken in international forums, such as the Paris Declaration of 2005 and the post-Accra agreement of 2008? In particular, this paper focuses on the new multi-facility exporting zones (MFEZ) established by China in Zambia.
• Does the expansion of East Asian countries’ interests in Africa contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction in Africa? In particular, this paper focuses on issues concerning the prospects for job creation and land use rights.

… to read more about the findings, policy implications, download the full text at this web address: http://www.ui.se/upl/files/54056.pdf.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, China’s government started to publish white papers at an increasing rate. (for a list of what has hitherto been published see: http://www.gov.cn/english/links/whitepapers.htm). It all started with the first “defensive” white paper on human rights, in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and ensuing chill that was directed toward China from the outside, meaning mainly, the Western world. After that first white paper, there followed a sequence of papers that covered the issue of Tibet and a host of other topics that has previously been off-limit or too sensitive for open discussion. In all, 51 white papers have been published so far. Although somewhat puzzling, since 2006, this list has not been updated.

Anyhow,  in the name of openness, some very interesting white papers have been issued in the last couple of weeks, using what seems to be the new Chinese policy buzzword — transparency. The policy areas these papers cover are:

* National Defense   * Sino-African trade relations   * China’s foreign aid

Of course, the topics are not chosen haphazardly. China’s rising defense expenditure is a cause of concern and anxiously viewed by the ASEAN-countries, India, Japan, Australia, and the USA. Likewise, China’s hunt for national resources in Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia and the deals made with other developing nations have been attacked for non being transparent and corrupting. These latest publications testify to the Chinese government’s acknowledgement that overseas perceptions of Chinese secrecy must be dealt with – by laying some cards on the table.

Transparency in the foreign policy arena

The transparency drive within Chinese officialdom merits our attention. It may seem a novel thing, but as the list above shows it isn’t really altogether new. The steady stream of white papers and the short intervals between their publication indicates an institutionalization of transparency and openness within parts of Chinese officialdom.

Is this institutionalization due to outside pressure, indirect or more direct, and calls for more openness in China’s handling of international affairs, motives, and the furthering of its national interests? Or is it rather, an impetus coming from different actors inside China: private businesses, state-owned companies, NGOs, and competing interests within the still unwieldy state and provincial bureaucracy? Or, is it a combination of both external and internal factors?  It is a fact that, on the one hand, China’s leaders and politics have been drawn into international discourses due to increasing participation by Chinese policymakers and analysts in multilateral forums and debates – and the need to respond to outside criticism, regardless of how it is judged. Inside China, on the other hand, many interest groups saw the need for compromise, cooperation, dialogue, and engagement with outside norms to make China accepted and viewed as a “peaceful rising” power and, in the pursuit of business interest, a reliable business partner.

Overseas, a younger cohort of skilled Chinese diplomats have been lauded for their willingness to engage in dialogue with the press in the countries where they are posted. This paradigmatic shift from opaque behavior and secrecy is the result of a successful training program started by China’s foreign ministry in the beginning of the 1980s. Most of these younger secretaries and ambassadors speak one foreign language more or less fluently, and many have been educated abroad.

Most (but not all) Chinese white papers are now available on the websites of the State Council Information Office (www.china.org.cn), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(www.fmprc.gov.cn), and the Ministry of Commerce. They all offer loads of data on their websites, outlining and explaining positions on regional and global issues, uploading transcripts of meetings with the press (depending on the sensitivity of the questions asked, some Q & As are not included in the transcript). By and large, however, these ministries have gone a long way, from Deng Xiaoping’s time (not to mention Mao era inscrutability and opacity) to facilitate the needs of foreign journalists and businessmen. It’s all part and parcel of boosting that other goal (and buzzword) — soft power — getting the “true” message of China and its achievements out to the wider world.

Non-transparency National

The recent crackdown on Chinese activists and especially defense lawyers, belonging to the loose network of the “rights advocacy movement” – 维权运动 – has revealed to what extent and weight “rule of law” carries when the Communist Party senses the least inkling soft power. Not very much.

As law scholars Jerome Cohen and Stanley Lubman have argued in recent months, the rights enshrined in the Chinese constitution to protect individuals from incommunicado detention has not been adhered to in the high-profile arrests of, for example, artist Ai Weiwei and defense lawyer Teng Biao. Teng was finally released on April 29 after 70 days in detention. Ai Weiwei’s family has yet to hear from him or the police, which according to law must let relatives know the whereabouts and location of detained people within 24 hours after being arrested.

The implications of dissonance 

One doesn’t have to be a political Einstein to understand there is a dissonance between the drive for more openness in China’s public diplomacy and the domestic policy cover-ups. China’s diplomats continue to advance openness regarding foreign policy issues, but remain silent on the reasons for incommunicado detention. What is more difficult to fathom and prognosticate are the implications for China’s international relations if this dissonance increases. Or, just as bad, remains the same after Xi Jinping has risen to the apex of China’s collective leadership.

At a conference in Beijing last September, one of China’s most renowned political scientists, and international relations experts, Yan Xuetong, argued that one of China’s biggest problems in the realm of foreign policy was that the capacity and capabilities of its diplomatic corps did not keep up with the needs of China’s economic actors now present overseas in faraway places such as sub-Saharan Africa. (1)

Whereas I hold Yan’s argument about “overstretch” or “underreach” to be quite right, I also wonder if not the problem should rather be viewed more from the angle of the Chinese diplomat. Putting the question differently: is not the core problematique for PRC diplomats trying to explain Chinese policies, that domestic Chinese elites, especially the entrenched hardliners, center pragmatists, and even marginalized “reformers” in the Chinese Communist Party are not catching up with the diplomats increasing level of sophistication? Or even the level of perception – if we don’t assume diplomats to be nothing but empty messengers for their governments. The non-transparency of China’s judicial system and continued lack of rule of law are destroying years of effective diplomatic work to enhance a more positive image of China abroad. Therefore, the outcome of this gap and dissonance can only be negative for the perceptions of China abroad, something that neon billboards, charming ambassadors, and white papers cannot make up for. Therefore, China’s efforts at “transparency international” need to be met with efforts at transparency nationally. (2)

(1) Li Wentao, (2010). “A summary of an International Academic Symposium on China and the Changing World Order,” Contemporary International Relations, No. 10, p.62.

(2) By the way: in the index of the organization Transparency International, China has risen in TI’s country index over corruption perception. Out of 178 countries, having climbed the ladder toward cleanliness, China is now at rank 78, ahead of, for example, democratic India at number 87.

Much have been written in western mass media recently about the clampdown on dissent, or rather, would-be-dissent in China. Is this focus unwarranted and unfair? Chinese state-owned media believes that is the case. Outsiders should stay out of China’s internal affairs, as it has its own ways and “laws” to deal with “criminals.” With the disappearance of renowned Chinese artist Ai Weiwei from public view on April 3 – when policemen at Beijing capital airport arrested him – attention from the outside world became even more directed towards China’s human rights situation. It’s ironic that the whereabouts of the designer of the “birds nest” Olympic stadium in Beijing are unknown, as the Olympic Games heralded a new era in China

The Beijing Olympics and improvement of human rights

The 2008 Beijing Olympics were awarded to Beijing after a strong media campaign was launched around the world. Delegates of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) were convinced after listening to high-ranking policymakers in Beijing: giving China the opportunity to arrange the Olympics would also lead to an improvement of human rights. Well, perhaps it did improve for a short while, on the surface of things Yet, human rights organizations complained about how the city was cleaned up from unwanted elements during the months prior to this mega event. And during the weeks of the Olympics a test of letting ordinary Beijingers apply for demonstration permits failed miserably: none of those who filed a form were allowed to stage a protest against even anything minor. Moreover, several people were taken in by police for questioning though. Since the closure of the Beijing games, however, the situation for human rights in China has deteriorated – for lawyers, activists, journalists, bloggers, and scholars.

Who’s afraid of Ai Weiwei?

Think of the Chinese Communist Party as the director of a symphony orchestra. All instruments are played by intellectual elite strata. Some soloists may be tolerated, but only within limits. No dissonance, no detours as a harmonious tune must be played. Think of Ai Weiwei as playing the trombone. He did not fall back into line, a stubborn artist not wanting to bend to the will of the director/authorities.

This angered the party more than it made them afraid. Quite a few observers have remarked that the arrest of Ai Weiwei shows the fragility and nervousness permeating the top echelons of the Chinese Communist Party. Others believe that the recent clampdown is due to the ripple effects of the unrest and toppling of regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. When it comes to the case of Ai, I think that the party is more annoyed than afraid. His mere existence as and increasingly outspoken critic of China’s political system could no longer be tolerated, even if marginalized and effectively censored. I think that the effects from the Middle East are indirect. It has not yet stirred the masses, but has made the power ministries and security apparatus more vigilant.

The unknown Ai Weiwei

Some observations have focused on how unknown – and somewhat contradictory – unpopular both Ai Weiwei and Nobel peace prize laureate Liu Xiaobo are among the Chinese public. Often these arguments come from so-called establishment intellectuals who believe in, or have to parrot, government views of stability, order and “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Given the nature of China’s state-controlled media, not exactly geared toward soliciting the views of dissenting voices, how could “mainstream” Chinese, such as Mr. Wang at Yunnan street in the city of Jilin, or Ms. Li in Hangzhou know about this artist of famous descent?

Even in a democracy like Sweden, if you randomly picked out ten tech-savvy students from a high-school and showed them a photo of this country’s most “provocative and dissenting” artist – I am quite sure only 1 in 10 would have heard about him. And this in an uncensored media landscape, where people are nowadays glued to social media gadgets and all things crazy and hot, such as provocative artists and stand-up comedians.

Yet, in China the Communist Party cannot stand such abnormal behavior. What I in my latest book, After the Internet, Before Democracy: Competing Norms in Chinese Media and Society, call “the party-state norm” must be upheld at all costs. But believe me, this cost is weighing heavier with every passing day: politically, economically, symbolically, and culturally.

A hardliner time will sow seeds of dissonance and dissent

If China’s leaders have chosen to enter a hardliner mood for the long-term, not just until next year’s passing of the supreme baton to vice-president Xi Jinping, it will prove counterproductive. Today’s China is not the China of 1990, or the China of 1999. A hardline phase may in society — but also inside officialdom and the Party-apparatus — sow seeds of dissent and criticism, however muffled. Overreacting to invisible inside enemies and foreign straw men is not likely to pay off. Perhaps top leaders such as security god father Zhou Yongkang rest assured that they can get away with a continued hardliner stance? A recent Pew Institute survey just out shows that 87 percent of Chinese respondents are favorably disposed to China’s political system. (1)

I would not count too much on the Pew survey, however, as it is likely to be skewed by selection bias. Too few informants in the troubled countryside were interviewed, and given the continuing censorship of the internet, I guess more and more cosmopolitan urbanites will stop adhering to the propagated party-norm too.

(1) “Upbeat Chinese May Not Be Primed for a Jasmine Revolution” Pew Institute, http://t.co/9P8p7Bj

If you have the chance to visit the palace museum Beit al-Sahel in  Zanzibar’s Stone Town, and are interested in the history of Sino-African relations, don’t miss a photo on the second floor. Amongst the 18th and 19th century weaponry and artworks on display, you will see this fantastic black and white photograph of a small grocery shop beside a dusty road in Stone Town from the days of the rule of the Sultans. Above the counter there is a sign on which grand Chinese black letters are written. In today’s Zanzibar, the signs put up by Chinese are written in English in red Latin letters. Now, they do no longer sell bananas and spices, but medical services such as acupuncture, although in the favelas of Angola’s capital Luanda and in other African countries, Chinese shop-owners may actually sell fruit and celery.

Waves of Chinese migration to African countries

This photo serves as a bridge through time, it sets imagination in motion and brings to mind the 17th century armada of Chinese officials, soldiers, scholars, and soldiers who stepped onto the shores of East Africa, under the leadership of that famed Muslim eunuch Zheng He. How many of them never went back to China, staying in Africa, to literally set up shop there, and slowly integrate with the local community. Since then there’s been a couple of waves of small-scale immigration from China to the African continent. Most waves were due to colonialist powers contracting Chinese laborers for what was to be short term projects. Many, however, stayed on. Not so much different from today’s Chinese construction workers who somehow manage to linger for years – or settle down – in Africa.

From the 1950s and onwards, Taiwan outsourced manufacturing to both apartheid South Africa, and to Mauritius where there already existed a sizable ethnic Chinese community.  In our time, the flow of migrants from the People’s Republic is picking up speed. There are no reliable statistics, but the number of Chinese now residing in Africa could be anywhere between 700, 000 and 1 million. Due to illegal immigration and the fact that many of the Chinese small traders spend only a couple of months in African countries every year, make it difficult to estimate with any certainty.

The promise of Chinese-led industrialization of Africa

According to the World Bank, economic growth for Africa is set to increase by 5.3 percent in 2011. To a large extent, this growth is due to trade with China, India, and other countries of the global South. The promise and magic of outsourcing of Asian industries to Africa looks good on paper. But will it materialize? Let’s hope so.

The economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese embassy in Kampala, Zhou Xiaoming has argued that “Labor costs in China have been rising. This has increased the cost of manufacturing. We plan to relocate small, light industries to undeveloped countries where the cost of labor is low. The economic environment here is also good and competitive, which will allow to build business confidence.”

I am just back from Uganda where I conducted fieldwork on the extent and importance of East Asian traders, investors, and aid delivery. Even though the foreign aid arms of Japanese and Korean officialdom, JICA and KOICA, are doing important work in Uganda -it is China that really matters. And it is almost all about trade and loans, not grant aid. Investments from, and trade with, Japan and Korea are miniscule in comparison with the Chinese juggernaut. Last year, Chinese investments in the country amounted to $65 million. They are spread out across sectors, where agribusiness and mining are most important. In all, these Chinese money go into 33 projects. And the scene changes at high speed. In 2008, trade volume between Uganda and China was at $247 million , 2009 it was $251 million, and last year it rose to $284 million. The balance is in China’s favor, as it last year exported $258 million and imported  Ugandan goods to a value of mere $26 million. When I asked an aid officer with JICA if she knew of any Japanese investors in Uganda, she said they were very few. “There is this man who has been here for 40 years, running a textile mill. He was here even during dictator Idi Amin’s brutal regime, when almost all other foreign capitalist and merchants were thrown out. But he’s kind of special.”

Creating or competing for jobs?

Counsellor Zhou in Kampala explained that the “new” Chinese industries would create jobs for the local people and spur investments in Africa, creating a stable and sustainable economic growth.

A recent article by Angolan journalist, Rafael Marques de Morais (“The new imperialism: China in Angola, see http://bit.ly/etQuMr) convey a now familiar message about the growing pool of Chinese labor and merchants competing with the locals in the markets of jobs and goods. “The majority of Chinese workers in Angola are engaged in reconstruction projects, but many thousands have branched out and become real estate developers, retailers, photocopy shop owners, street hawkers, and masseurs.”

Well, will Chinese industries that go to Africa really create jobs? Needless to say, it is difficult for any state, including the Chinese, to promise job creation. Given the volatility of international markets, and the difficulties to prognosticate national and global macroeconomic conditions far ahead. Economic fundamentals rule. Not even the sorcerers and magicians of Chinese state capitalism can have the audience spell-bound for long. I sure hope that their efforts will materialize into serious job creation. They deserve a lot of praise if they succeed. If such promises are not delivered upon, however, they can easily be picked up by populist political parties in election campaigns and backfire. Especially if the trickle of illegal immigration leads to a situation where ever more ethnic Chinese shops and businesses out-compete locals in the market.